On Being and Saying: If someone threatens you with death unless you torture someone else to death, I think you have not the right, even to save your life, to do so.
We are told that performing the abortion would he directly killings the child, whereas doing nothing would not be killing the mother, but only letting her die. There you are, you were kidnapped, and nine years in bed with that violinist lie ahead of you.
However, this does not mean that the person being crushed cannot act in self-defense and attack the child to save his or her own life. You are sorry, but you simply cannot see giving up so much of your life to the sustaining of his. A Good Samaritan would not refuse--or anyway, a Splendid Samaritan, if the sacrifices that had to be made were enormous.
There is no injustice to the violinist in our doing so. It is concluded that the fetus is. I have argued that you are not morally required to spend nine months in bed, sustaining the life of that violinist, but to say this is by no means to say that if, when you unplug yourself, there is a miracle and he survives, you then have a right to turn round and slit his throat.
Some opponents of abortion are inclined to regard this as beneath contempt--thereby showing insensitivity to what is surely a powerful source of despair. In moral philosophy she has made significant contributions to meta-ethicsnormative ethics and applied ethics.
I am inclined to think it a merit of my account precisely that it does not give a general yes or a general no. She was a successful interior designer and an arts and antique dealer and importer. How, precisely, are we supposed to get from there to the conclusion that abortion is morally impermissible?
I shall come back to third-party interventions later.
We are not told what the options were, that is, whether or not the priest and the Levite could have helped by doing less than the Good Samaritan did, but assuming they could have, then the fact they did nothing at all shows they were not even Minimally Decent Samaritans, not because they Judith thomson s a defense of not Samaritans, but because they were not even minimally decent.
My argument will be found unsatisfactory on two counts by many of those who want to regard abortion as morally permissible. Surely we do not have any such "special responsibility" for a person unless we have assumed it, explicitly or implicitly.
Thomson also explicitly rejects the claim that pregnant women have a right to kill their offspring. And went to him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him on his own beast, and brought him to an inn, and took care of him.
Now I could well understand it if a bystander were to say. In killing the fetus, one would be directly killing an innocent person. What if he appeals to us to extricate him? There is room for much discussion and argument as to precisely which, if any.
For we should now, at long last, ask what it comes to, to have a right to life. But I have no right at all against anybody that he should do this for me. She gives as an example a hypothetical woman who seeks a late-term abortion "just to avoid the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad" and declares this to be "positively indecent".
So you cannot ever be unplugged from him. He has been found to have a fatal kidney ailment, and the Society of Music Lovers has canvassed all the available medical records and found that you alone have the right blood type to help.
The fact that she does adds to the offensiveness of deducing that the mother can do nothing from the supposition that third parties can do nothing. Most opposition to abortion relies on the premise that the fetus is a human being, a person, from the moment of conception.
It could be argued that he has a right against us that we should allow him to continue to use your kidneys. Suppose you find yourself trapped in a tiny house with a growing child. It would be frightfully nice of him to fly in from the West Coast to provide it.
If the doctor refuses, then the woman is denied her right. How is it supposed to come out that an abortion may not be performed? Is it to be said, "Ah, well, it follows that in this case she has a right to the touch of his hand on her brow, and so it would be an injustice in him to refuse"?In A Defense of Abortion (Cahn and Markie), Judith Thomson presents an argument that abortion can be morally permissible even if the fetus is considered to be a person.
Her primary reason for presenting an argument of this nature is that the abortion argument at the time had effectively come to a. A Defense of Abortion – Judith Jarvis Thomson. As the title makes plain, Thomson argues that abortion is not impermissible.
More precisely, she argues for the conclusion that abortion is sometimes permissible; she grants that there are scenarios in which obtaining an abortion would be immoral. What is especially novel is the manner in which Thomson constructs her argument. mint-body.com (no proxy) mint-body.com  (no proxy) mint-body.com  (no proxy) Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)Author: Judith Jarvis Thomson.
A Critique of Judith Thomson’s A Defense of Abortion Essay. In A Defense of Abortion (Cahn and Markie), Judith Thomson presents an argument that abortion can be morally permissible even if the fetus is considered to be a person. Thomson’s (T) imaginative examples and controversial conclusions have made “A Defense of Abortion“ perhaps “the most widely reprinted essay in all of contemporary philosophy.” T does not think the conceptus (a neutral way of referring to the fetus) is a person from the moment of conception.
Essay about Response to Judith Jarvis Thomson's A Defense for Abortion Response to Judith Jarvis Thomson's A Defense for Abortion Judith Jarvis Thomson, in "A Defense of Abortion", argues that even if we grant that fetuses have a fundamental right to life, in .Download